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COP21 climate negotiators’ responses to climate
model forecasts
Valentina Bosetti1,2*, ElkeWeber3, Loïc Berger2,4, David Budescu5, Ning Liu1,2 and Massimo Tavoni2,6
Policymakers involved in climate change negotiations are key1
users of climate science. It is therefore vital to understand2
how to communicate scientific information most eectively to3
this group1. We tested how a unique sample of policymakers4
and negotiators at the Paris COP21 conference update their5
beliefs on year 2100 global mean temperature increases6
in response to a statistical summary of climate models’7
forecasts. We randomized the way information was provided8
across participants using three dierent formats similar to9
those used in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change10
reports2,3. In spite of having received all available relevant11
scientific information, policymakers adopted such information12
very conservatively, assigning it less weight than their own13
prior beliefs. However, providing individual model estimates14
in addition to the statistical range was more eective in15
mitigating such inertia. The experiment was repeated with a16
population of European MBA students who, despite starting17
from similar priors, reported conditional probabilities closer to18
the provided models’ forecasts than policymakers. There was19
also no eect of presentation format in theMBAsample. These20
results highlight the importance of testing visualization tools21
directly on the population of interest.22
Climate change policy whether at a local, national or23
international scale requires dealing with the presence of uncertainty24
on many dimensions4. These uncertainties may be grouped into25
two broad categories: those associated with socio-economic,26
demographic, geo-political and technological drivers; and those27
associated with the science of climate itself and, in particular, the28
response of the climate system to increases in CO2 concentration29
in the atmosphere. Scientists and advisory bodies such as the30
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) handle and31
report these uncertainties in different ways. Uncertainties about32
both categories are typically dealt with by means of multi-model33
ensembles, either of integrated assessment models5 or of climate34
models6. These comparison exercises generate distributions of35
variables of interest, which incorporate model and parametric36
uncertainty. They are routinely represented and summarized in37
reports such as the ones produced by the IPCC (see Supplementary38
Fig. 4 for examples of formats used to represent these uncertainties).39
Studies that examine people’s response to, and use of, probabilis-40
tic information suggest that individuals may treat uncertainty from41
distinct sources differently7, and that the communication format42
can affect how they use this information1,8. Concerns have been43
raised about the implications of uncertainty and its presentation44
format on their use in climate change decisions1,3,9–11. However, little45
is known about the way policymakers, directly involved in climate46
negotiations, process and
Q.1
react to the data and projections presented47
in written discussions and graphical displays (as, for example, in the 48
IPCC summaries for policymakers). 49
Our goal in this experiment is to investigate climate negotiators’ 50
reactions to climate scientific uncertainty and theway it is presented. 51
We address this problem by centring the experiment on a central 52
issue in climate change policymaking: global climate models’ pro- 53
jections of global temperatures increase by the year 2100 as a result 54
of current and future greenhouse gas emissions. Tomake our exper- 55
iment relevant to the policy debate, we use an emission scenario that 56
builds on the pledged ‘nationally determined contribution’ (NDC). 57
Our respondents are a unique sample of 217 policymakers attending 58
the Paris COP21 conference, more than half of them being active 59
negotiators (including eight heads of delegations). To investigate the 60
specificities of this population, we compare policymakers’ responses 61
with those of 140 EuropeanMBA students, trained to play a country 62
role in a climate negotiation simulation. 63
Our results provide insights into climate negotiators’ expecta- 64
tions of future global warming and their reaction to scientific fore- 65
casts. Specifically, our experiment enables us to answer four research 66
questions in a real world setting:What are climate policymakers’ ex- 67
pectations of future temperature increases? How do climate models’ 68
predictions change their expectations? How is the effectiveness of 69
climate models’ predictions affected by the way model information 70
and its associated uncertainty is presented? Are climate policymak- 71
ers different (in their beliefs and use of model predictions) from 72
informed members of the general public? 73
Related to the first question, Fig. 1 depicts policymakers’ 74
ex ante beliefs (or priors) about the effects of NDCs on long- 75
term global temperature increase, elicited for four (mutually 76
exclusive and exhaustive) temperature increase intervals. (Only 77
18% of respondents reported probabilities for the four ranges of 78
temperature increases that summed up to 100%. For the purpose of 79
our analyses we normalized the four subjective probabilities Q.2given 80
by each individual to add up to 100% (ref. 12)). Q.3The respondents 81
were not given any information about the emission pathway in the 82
period 2030–2100. Thus, they were free to report probabilities that 83
reflected both their beliefs about future emissions and about the 84
resulting evolution of the temperature. The future deemed most 85
likely is that of 2100 temperature increases of 2–3 ◦C, followed 86
closely by the 3–4 ◦C scenario. These scenarios are in line with 87
the debate preceding the Paris conference, with estimates ranging 88
between 2.7 ◦C and 3.5 ◦C, as provided by the United Nations 89
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)13 and 90
Climate Interactive14 respectively. The median judged probability 91
of 2100 temperature increase below 2 ◦C is 8%. Although the 92
distribution of probability assigned to this scenario is wide, most 93
respondents did not assign more than a 20% probability to this 94
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Figure 1 | Distribution of prior probabilities across temperature bins. The box line shows the median, and the edges are the 25th and 75th percentiles of
the sample. Whiskers are 1.5 times the interquartile range away from the top or bottom of the box (covering 99% of the data if normally distributed).
Outliers are displayed with a red plus sign. See Supplementary Fig. 5 for the same figure for the student sample.
event. This low probability assigned to the<2 ◦C scenario is in stark1
contrast with the stated goal of the Paris agreement that emphasized2
the need to limit temperature increases to be ‘well below 2 ◦C’. MBA3
students reported similar prior distributions (Supplementary Fig. 5).
Q.4
4
The prior beliefs do not differ for climate negotiators directly5
involved in the negotiation process versus non-negotiator6
policymakers present at the Paris conference, and are not associated7
with other individual characteristics such as age or gender. However,8
there is evidence of regional differences. We classified respondents9
into five groups of countries (not mutually exclusive) that are10
relevant to climate negotiations: vulnerable (countries/regions11
vulnerable to consequences of climate changes); emerging economy12
(countries/regions experiencing economy booming); energy13
exporter (countries/regions that are major exporters of fossil fuels);14
high emitters (seven highest greenhouse gas emitters); and OECD15
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)16
members (see Supplementary Information 2 for a detailed17
description of country clusters). Representatives of vulnerable and18
emerging economies assign a lower probability to the 2–3 ◦C bin,19
and a higher one to the high temperature outcome of >4◦ (see20
Supplementary Table 1).21
To answer our second question, we assess how COP2122
policymakers use climate models’ predictions when being asked23
for the probability distribution of 2100 global temperature increase24
based on a specific emission pathway. Before providing their25
estimates, policymakers received the range of predictions made26
by major climate models associated with this specific emission27
pathway. The projected temperature was shown by means of28
boxplot, displayed in threeQ.5 different formats (see Fig. 3 hereafter).29
Reported conditional probabilities move clearly in the direction of30
the climate models’ forecasts (19% of the COP21 sample adopt the31
provided forecasts, almost exactly, while 61% move in the direction32
of that information). However, policymakers’ probability estimates 33
of temperature increases conditional on the specific emission 34
pathway adhere more closely to their unconditional priors than to 35
the forecasts provided (see Supplementary Information 3). 36
Figure 2 shows the joint distributions of priors and probabilities 37
conditional on the given emission pathway. Respondents with no 38
private information on the validity of alternative climate models’ 39
projections could adopt the provided model forecasts, while study 40
participants who are aware of some of the controversies over 41
the forecast could reasonably have given more weight to their 42
own views. Observations along the horizontal black line represent 43
individuals who completely adopt the provided model forecasts as 44
their conditional probabilities. Observations along the diagonal line 45
represent individuals who did not move from their priors at all 46
(respectively 28%, 20%, 24% and 30% of respondents for the four 47
temperature categories, and 18% for all four of them). These figures 48
include those respondents whose prior was right on the mark (1 in 49
the<2 ◦C scenario and 3 in the>4 ◦C scenario); hence, they had no 50
reason to change their prior. Confirming previous research15, more 51
than 80% of respondents did not treat the scientific information as a 52
posterior probability, but rather used it as additional information 53
to update their prior beliefs, mostly in a very conservative 54
fashion (see Supplementary Tables 3 and 4 in Supplementary 55
Information 4 and Supplementary Discussion). Interestingly, in the 56
follow-up experiment with MBA students conditional probabilities 57
are much less close to prior beliefs on average, 25% of the 58
sample almost exactly reporting the provided information (see 59
Supplementary Fig. 6). 60
Different mechanisms might make respondents anchor on their 61
unconditional priors, when being asked to report the probabilities of 62
the given emission scenario. These mechanisms might furthermore 63
have different impacts on different individuals. 64
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Figure 2 | Scatter plot of the prior and conditional probabilities across temperature bins. Each dot is an observation, the coloured lines represent a linear
fit to the data and the black lines represent the scientific information. The bisector line is dotted. Boxplots show the distribution of the prior and conditional
probabilities, as in Fig. 1. See Supplementary Fig. 6 for the same Figure for the Student sample.
The first mechanism relates to the confidence respondents1
have in their priors16. We find that reported confidence in the2
prior (on a 7-point scale) for policymakers (median = 5.00,3
iqr= 1.75) is higher (Wilcoxon p value = 0.02) than for MBA4
students (median= 4.0, iqr= 2), with active negotiators and other5
COP21 participants reporting similar levels of confidence (p=0.82,6
Wilcoxon test). The difference in confidence could be the result of7
different perceptions of expertise and power, as confidence in one’s8
own judgement has been shown to negatively affect advice tak-9
ing17,18. For COP21 non-negotiator policymakers, high confidence10
in the prior is associated with large distances between their reported11
conditional probabilities and the provided scientific information.12
In contrast, active negotiators’ andMBA students’ distance between13
conditional probabilities and scientific information is independent14
of their confidence level (see Supplementary Fig. 1).15
The negotiators reported conditional probabilities that were16
more distant from the scientific information than the non-17
negotiator policymakers in Paris (this is a result robust to the18
different tests presented in Supplementary Information 4) as well19
as than the MBA students (Supplementary Table 8). A second20
possibility is that negotiators (consciously and/or unconsciously)21
may be more cautious in reporting conditional probabilities that22
differ from their country’s (or block of countries’) negotiation23
position, which is in turn possibly reflected in their priors.24
In summary, our data show that, in answer to the second question25
posed, the policymakers’ reported conditional probabilities failed26
to fully incorporate the scientific information they received. Future27
research is needed to identify the exact mechanism(s) at play.28
Our third question addresses the way uncertain forecasts29
extracted from scientific models are interpreted as a function of the30
presentation format. Figure 3 shows different ways of communi-31
cating the uncertainty in predictions across climate models (these32
formats are commonly used in the IPCC 5thAssessment Report and 33
examples are provided in Supplementary Information). Participants 34
were randomly assigned one of the three formats. Format 1 presents 35
the mean and the central 90% of the predictions across scientific 36
models. Formats 2 and 3 provide additional information about 37
model uncertainty, that is, the fact that differentmodels generate dif- 38
ferent estimates. Format 2 highlights those models whose estimates 39
fall outside the 90% uncertainty range, while Format 3 presents 40
all models’ estimates. These formats thus provide information on 41
similarities between models, clustering of predictions, and outliers. 42
Since the three formats provide increasing details about the 43
underlying scientific uncertainty, we are interested in their relative 44
effectiveness in influencing reported conditional probabilities. 45
Figure 4 shows the proportion of respondents whose conditional 46
probability is closer to scientific information across the four 47
temperature bins for each of the three presentation formats. 48
Providing policymakers with the individual model estimates in 49
addition to the statistical range (Format 3) increases the likelihood 50
of reporting conditional probabilities closer to the scientific 51
information (further analysis is provided in Supplementary Table 7). 52
The >4 ◦C scenario is the only one where Format 3 is not 53
outperforming the other formats. The respondents judged the 54
three formats to be equally credible (on average 4.6 on a 55
1–7 scale). However, scientific information provided using Format 56
3 was perceived as marginally more informative than Format 1 57
(see Supplementary Table 6 for details). Interestingly, the effect 58
of format is not significant in the MBA student sample (see 59
Supplementary Table 8). These results highlight the importance of 60
testing visualization tools directly on the population of interest. 61
Although the scientific understanding of the response of the 62
climate system to increases in CO2 concentration will improve over 63
time, significant uncertainty and disagreements across climate and 64
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Predicted 2100 temperature increase over pre-industrial level 
Format 1 Format 2 Format 3
The box covers 90% of the estimated
temperatures (box edges represent
the 5th and 95th percentiles) with
the central line marking the mean.  
The box covers 90% of the estimated 
temperatures (box edges represent the
5th and 95th percentiles) with the central
line marking the mean. Each dot represents
the temperature projection of a climate
model that falls outside the box edges
The box covers 90% of the estimated
temperatures (box edges represent the
5th and 95th percentiles) with the
central line marking the mean. Each
dot represents the temperature
projection of a climate model. 
Figure 3 | Dierent formats employed across subjects in the presentation of model forecasts.
































Figure 4 | Proportion of respondents whose conditional probability is closer to scientific information. See Supplementary Fig. 7 for the same figure for the
student sample.
economic models are likely to persist19. Science communication1
(and particularly uncertainty communication) will be increasingly2
relevant in climate change and science-based policymaking. Our3
results point to the importance of testing behavioural effects4
targeting the population of interest. Greater efforts need to be5
devoted to the understanding of how policymakers perceive and6
react to scientific uncertainty in light of the multiplicity of goals and7
constituencies and how they are affected by the way it is presented20 8
to tailor the communications to the specific problem at hand and 9
the relevant target populations.
Q.6
10
Our study provides a unique glimpse at COP21 policymakers’ 11
beliefs and responses to climate models’ forecasts. The comparison 12
between their responses and those of a climate-educated MBA 13
student population answers our fourth question and reveals two 14
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striking behavioural phenomena. The first is a notable anchoring1
effect21 of prior beliefs, which is much more pronounced for poli-2
cymakers. Policymakers, though not distinguishable in their priors3
from the student sample, were less likely to revise their condi-4
tional probabilities in the direction of the model’s forecasts (Sup-5
plementary Fig. 5 and Supplementary Table 8). The second result,6
particularly important for future communication of uncertainty7
to key users, is that the gap between initial beliefs and scientific8
evidence can be partially reduced by using an adequate presentation9
format (see Supplementary Table 7). Our results reinforce recent10
calls for the incorporation of behavioural (in addition to normative)11
models of judgement and choice into public policy22 and suggest a12
more effective, and relatively easy to implement, format to visually13
communicate scientific information to policymakers. In that sense,14
application of our results could naturally take place for example in15
the next assessment report of the IPCC.16
Methods17
Methods, including statements of data availability and any18
associated accession codes and references, are available in the19
online version of this paper.20
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Methods1
We conducted a framed field experiment23 at the 2015 United Nations Climate2
Change Conference, COP21, held in Paris. We recruited 217 participants,3
representing more than 100 countries (the sample composition is described in4
Supplementary Table 9) and elicited their expectations for global temperature5
increases by 2100 before testing their responses to climate models’ projections.6
More than half of our respondents were climate negotiators, including eight heads7
of delegations. The others were non-negotiator policymakers from different8
communities.9
In individual in-person interviews, we prompted policymakers for their prior10
probability distribution of four different intervals of year 2100 global temperature11
increases (<2 ◦C, 2–3 ◦C, 3–4 ◦C,>4 ◦C), following implementation of current12
NDCs. We provided policymakers with response scales using the IPCC13
numeric–verbal format (see Supplementary Information 8).14
After eliciting policymakers’ prior distributions, we presented them with a15
specific extrapolation of the NDCs beyond 2030, where global emissions remained16
roughly constant throughout the century. We then presented policymakers with17
predicted 2100 temperature increases given that specific emission trajectory that18
were based on the transient climate response of all 30 climate models included in19
the 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC, WGI (Table 9.5)24. We presented20
policymakers with the results, shown in either one of the three boxplot formats in21
Fig. 3. These were introduced as follows: ‘the projections (in ◦C) as estimated by all22
climate models whose results on transient climate response are reported in the23
IPCC latest assessment report’. We then elicited the policymakers’ projections of24
long-term temperature conditional on the specified emission scenario (‘Based on25
the projections we have just shown you, and for each of the 4 ranges presented in26
the table below, could you please indicate the probability (or probabilities) that the27
temperature will be in that range.’). For this second round, we used again the28
response template shown in Supplementary Information 1 (in Supplementary29
Information 8 we report the full questionnaire used in the survey).30
Figure 3 shows different ways of communicating the uncertainty in predictions31
across climate models. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three32
formats. This provides greater accuracy but lower treatment effects than a33
within-subjects design. When we asked policymakers for the second round of34
estimates of the probability distribution over possible 2100 temperature increases,35
we instructed them to consider the specified emission pathway as given, to isolate36
the impact of climate uncertainty alone. In both rounds of probability elicitation,37
we asked policymakers to report their level of confidence in their estimates.38
In May 2016, a two-day simulation of a post-COP21 climate change negotiation39
(Climate Change Strategy Role Play held through CEMS - The Global Alliance in40
Management Education) took place in Erasmus University Rotterdam. This event41
involved MBA students from seven major European business schools who had42
received briefings in climate change science and UNFCCC climate negotiations.43
MBA students were playing the role of delegates to the COP21 process for a44
representative set of countries. These students had been preparing for this event for45
several months with documents including detailed background papers. We46
replicated the key portions of the experiment with a sample of 113 respondents.47
This MBA student sample is far more knowledgeable, in the content matter of the48
study, than any usual sample of students, or online survey subjects (because of their49
selection and preparation for the meeting). However, the students are less50
driven/influenced in their beliefs by national needs/agendas than actual climate51
negotiators, as they only play/act or simulate national roles.52
For both the Rotterdam and Paris experiments, informed consent was obtained53
from participants, consistent with procedures of a protocol approved by the54
Institutional Review Board at Columbia University.55
Analysis of priors.We used the STATA command ‘sureg’ to perform the seemingly56
unrelated regression25. Demographic controls in the regressions are gender, age,57
number of children, and education (dummy for each category), as responses to58
questions 1, 2, 3 and 7 in the questionnaire (see Supplementary Information 8).59
Description of regional coding. The coding of country/region clusters is based,60
primarily, on self-reported country represented. Of the 217 subjects, 84 did not61
provide enough information to allow us to code the country they represent,62
reporting ‘None’, ‘UN’, ‘University’ or simply nothing. We coded those who did not63
fill in information according to their reported nationality. In this way, we coded the64
country/region cluster for 21 more observations.65
The sample size is smaller than the total sample as some respondents did not fill66
either the country they represented or their demographic information.67
Vulnerable countries/regions in our sample are: Afghanistan, Antigua and68
Barbuda, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic,69
Chad, Comoros, Congo RDC, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana,70
Guatemala, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mongolia,71
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New72
Guinea, Philippines, Somali, Salvador, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, Togo, Tonga,73
Uganda, Vanuatu, Vietnam and Zambia.74
Emerging economy countries/regions in our sample are: Argentina, 75
Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesian, Malaysia, 76
Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines and Poland. 77
Energy exporter countries/regions in our sample are: Algeria, Australia, 78
Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Georgia, Iraq, Latvia, Lebanon, Mongolia, 79
Norway, Netherlands, Qatar, Russia, South Africa, Vietnam and 80
United States of America. 81
High-emitter countries/regions in our sample are: Brazil, China, European 82
Union, India, Japan, Russia and United States of America. 83
OECDmembers in our sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, 84
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 85
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, 86
United Kingdom and United States of America. 87
Analysis of conditional probabilities.We consider four metrics to quantify the 88
difference between reported conditional probabilities and the scientific 89
information. The metrics used in the analyses performed are based on two factors: 90
whether they are based on the differences bin-by-bin or aggregated across the four 91
temperature bins (Overall); and whether they measure the magnitude of change 92
(Continuous) or its direction (Dichotomous). 93
The following are the four metrics we used as dependent variables in the 94
regressions, the first two continuous, the last two dichotomous. 95
Overall_dis (continuous, overall): Euclidean distance between overall 96
probability distributions. 97
Bin_dis (continuous, bin-by-bin): Bin-by-bin absolute distance between 98
probabilities. 99
Overall_closer (dichotomous, overall): Dummy variable indicating whether the 100
Euclidean distance between the overall distribution of conditional probability and 101
information is smaller (or greater) than the Euclidean distance between the overall 102
distribution of prior and information. 103
Bin_closer (dichotomous, bin-by-bin): Bin-by-bin dummy variable indicating 104
whether the absolute distance between conditional probability and information is 105
smaller (or greater) than that between prior and information. 106
Raw versus normalized probabilities. Only 18% of respondents reported 107
probabilities for the four ranges of temperature increases that summed up 108
to 100%. 109
A large literature has studied ‘binary additivity’, that is, testing whether P(Event) 110
+P(Not Event)= 1. In most cases, and on average, this condition is satisfied. 111
However, studies that have looked at partitions of discrete distributions with more 112
than two outcomes, as in our case, all find a different behaviour. Indeed, results 113
from Tversky and Koehler26 show that additivity in such Q.12cases is much harder to 114
achieve and in fact quite rare, while subadditivity is more common. Redelmeier 115
et al.27 find evidence of subadditivity in judgements made by doctors. Fox and 116
Birke28 showed it on lawyers. Fox, Rogers and Tversky29, on option traders. Finding 117
that n>2 events sum to a probability> 1 may be driven by a bias toward the ‘case 118
partition’ ignorance prior of 1/2 for each event (see Fox and Rottenstreich30). 119
We found no significant differences between the COP21 and MBA students’ 120
samples in terms of the additivity of their probability estimates of either 121
distributions (priors and conditional probabilities). 122
For the purpose of our analyses we normalized the four subjective probabilities 123
given by each individual to add up to 100%. Our main findings are robust to the 124
exclusion of subadditive observations for either priors or conditional probabilities. 125
For more information, see Supplementary Table 5, where we test the robustness of 126
results presented to the use of raw data rather than normalized data. 127
Difference across formats. Figure 4 and Supplementary Fig. 7 report for each 128
temperature bin the proportion of respondents whose reported conditional 129
probability is closer to the scientific information than the corresponding prior. 130
Respondents were asked to judge the provided information along two 131
dimensions, credibility and informativeness. The range of scales for both variables 132
credibility and informativeness associated with each format is from 1 to 7. There is 133
no difference in credibility across formats (Kruskal–Wallis χ 2=2.99, df= 2, 134
p value= 0.22). Informativeness, however, is marginally different across the 135
formats (Kruskal–Wallis χ 2=5.00, df= 2, p value= 0.08). 136
Post hoc Dunn’s test with Bonferroni correction for two tests reveals that 137
Format 3 is marginally more informative than Format 1 (p=0.08) but there is no 138
difference between Format 1 and Format 2 (p=1.00) or between Format 2 and 139
Format 3 (p=0.16). Note that credibility and informativeness are measured in a 140
between-subject design, so the identified difference in perceptions across formats 141
could be bigger had the subjects been able to see multiple formats. Results are 142
presented in the Supplementary Information (Supplementary Table 6). 143
Data availability. The authors declare that data supporting the findings of this 144
study are available online. Further information regarding the code used and the 145
data produced are available from the corresponding author on request. 146
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